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HIS article reviews judicial and legislative developments in the area
of water law that occurred during the Survey period. The cases dis-
cussed address such topics as the Texas Open Beaches Act, water
quality, governmental liability for public improvements, bridge construction
on navigable waters, the administrative process and civil penalties, and con-
demnation and eminent domain.
I. CASE LAW
A. Texas Open Beaches Act
The most significant case law development during the Survey period oc-
curred under the Texas Open Beaches Act.1 Adopted in 1959, the Act enun-
ciates the Texas public policy favoring unrestricted public access to
beaches. 2 The Act contains measures that facilitate public access to both
state owned wet sand areas and privately owned upland beaches that extend
from the wet sand area to the vegetation line.3 The Act expressly recognizes
that the public may acquire an easement to use privately owned upland areas
by dedication, prescription, or custom. 4 In addition the Act creates a pre-
sumption in favor of the existence of a public easement5 in the area seaward
of the vegetation line and provides ground rules for determining beach
boundaries when the vegetation line is unclear 6 or has been artificially
modified. 7
Prior to 1986 the Act prompted only three appellate court decisions. Sea-
way Co. v. Attorney General8 affirmed the public's right to an easement on
B.A., M.A., University of Texas; J.D., University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Bicker-
staff, Health & Smiley, Austin, Texas; Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Texas School
of Law.
** B.A., Pomona College; J.D., University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Bickerstatf,
Health & Smiley, Austin, Texas.
1. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 61.011-.025 (Vernon 1978 & Supp. 1987).
2. Id. § 61.011.
3. Id. § 61.012.
4. Id. § 61.011.
5. Id. § 61.020.
6. Id. § 61.016.
7. Id. § 61.017.
8. 375 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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Galveston Island's East Beach on the basis of implied dedication and adverse
possession. Gulf Holding Corp. v. Brazoria County9 and Moody v. White 10
involved injunctions that required the removal of structures from the public
beach.
The three cases decided by the courts of appeals under the Act in 1986,
therefore, doubled the case law in the area. Villa Nova Resort, Inc. v.
State11 addressed the location of the public beach on South Padre Island.
Matcha v. Mattox 12 and Feinman v. State 13 each arose from beach and vege-
tation line relocation on Galveston Island as a result of Hurricane Alicia in
1983.
In Villa Nova a resort hotel sought a declaratory judgment of its rights in
a portion of its beachfront lot, located on the seaward side of its seawall,
pursuant to section 61.019 of the Act. The provision authorizes a littoral
owner 14 whose property rights are determined or affected by the Act to
bring suit for a declaratory judgment against the state. 15 The court in Villa
Nova addressed two issues: (1) whether a public easement existed to permit
use of the beach without restriction by the upland owner; and (2) if a public
easement did exist, the exact location of that easement.
Due to both natural conditions and commercial development, the location
of the South Padre Island vegetation line is frequently difficult to identify.
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's finding that the line of vegeta-
tion was co-extensive with Villa Nova's existing seawall. 16 Since no clearly
marked line of vegetation ran across the area in question, the court referred
to section 61.016 of the Act to determine the location of the vegetation line.
To ascertain the location of a vegetation line, section 61.016 requires a court
to draw a line that will connect the nearest clearly marked lines of vegetation
on each side of an unmarked area. 17 Applying the section 61.016 formula,
the court of appeals found that evidence regarding the location of adjacent
vegetation lines presented by two experts in the trial court was sufficient to
support a finding that the existing seawall was generally co-extensive with a
pre-existing line of sparse discontinuous vegetation.18
Relying on evidence presented in the trial court by fourteen witnesses con-
cerning both their own use of the South Padre Island beaches and their ob-
servations of beach use by others, the court of appeals found that an
9. 497 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
10. 593 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, no writ).
11. 711 S.W.2d 120 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
12. 711 S.W.2d 95 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
13. 717 S.W.2d 106 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ).
14. A "littoral owner" is the owner of land adjacent to the shore. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE
ANN. § 61.001(4) (Vernon 1978).
15. Id. § 61.019.
16. 711 S.W.2d at 126.
17. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 61.016(a), (b) (Vernon 1978).
18. 711 S.W.2d at 127. Dr. Robert Morton, a research scientist at the University of
Texas, utilized aerial photographs of South Padre Island taken in 1955 and 1962. Mr.
Montemayor, a civil engineer and licensed land surveyor, prepared a plat using the methods
set forth in § 61.016 of the Act. Id. at 126-27.
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easement by prescription had been established. 19 The evidence demon-
strated that the public had used the beaches of the entire island for various
recreational purposes for more than ten years prior to the construction of
Villa Nova. The court of appeals further ruled that evidence was sufficient
to establish a right of use and easement by dedication. 20 The court consid-
ered Villa Nova's construction of the seawall, segregating the resort from the
beach, sufficient to induce the public to believe that the owner intended to
dedicate the area seaward of the wall to public use. The public's continued
use of the seaward area following construction of the resort hotel and sea-
wall evidenced the public's acceptance of the dedication. The court of ap-
peals declined to address the trial court's finding of a public easement by
custom.2 1
Finally, the court of appeals rejected Villa Nova's interpretation of sec-
tions 61.016 and 61.017 of the Act. Villa Nova maintained that a line 200
feet landward of mean low tide constitutes the landward boundary of an area
subject to public easement where no clearly marked line of vegetation exists.
The court of appeals agreed that if it were impossible to determine the loca-
tion of any vegetation line, section 61.016(c) might indicate an easement
boundary 200 feet inland of the low tide line. 22 Evidence presented in the
trial court, however, did identify a sparse vegetation line, rendering section
61.016(c) inapplicable. 23 The court asserted that the 200-foot inland line
described in section 61.017(b) applied only in instances in which the vegeta-
tion line was obliterated or artificially modified. 24 The court stated that the
200-foot line established the boundary of the public easement contingent
upon a final court adjudication that established the line in another place.2 5
According to the court of appeals, the trial court had correctly established
the vegetation line in another place, at Villa Nova's existing seawall.
26
The two other appellate court cases decided during the Survey period fo-
cused on the effect of sudden shifts in the vegetation line caused by a natural
disaster. In Matcha v. Mattox 27 the Austin court of appeals affirmed the
judgment of the trial court that prohibited Matcha from reconstructing and
landscaping his Galveston beach house following Hurricane Alicia in Au-
gust 1983. Hurricane damage moved the natural line of vegetation inland.
19. Id. An easement by prescription is obtained by proving the elements of adverse pos-
session: "(1) possession of the land; (2) use or enjoyment of it; (3) an adverse or hostile claim;
(4) an inclusive dominion over the area and appropriation of it for public use and benefit; and,
(5) for more than the ten year statutory period." Id. at 127 (citing Moody v. White, 593
S.W.2d 372, 377 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, no writ)).
20. 711 S.W.2d at 128. "The elements of implied dedication are: (1) the landowner in-
duced the belief that he intended to dedicate the area in question to public use; (2) the land-
owner was competent to do so, i.e., had fee simple title; (3) the public relied on the acts of the
landowner and will be served by the dedication; and (4) there was an offer and acceptance of
the dedication." Id. (citing Lindner v. Hill, 691 S.W.2d 590, 592 (Tex. 1985)).
21. 711 S.W.2d at 128.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 129-30.
24. Id. at 129.
25. Id. (quoting TEX. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. § 61.017(b) (Vernon 1978)).
26. Id. at 129.
27. 711 S.W.2d 95 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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As a result, Matcha's dwelling, previously inland from the vegetation line,
was located seaward of the natural line of vegetation. The attorney general
asserted that the public's common law right of use and easement moved in-
land with the vegetation line, thus rendering Matcha's home an illegal ob-
struction of the public easement.
The appellate court's decision is significant in three regards. First,
Matcha was the first case expressly to recognize a public easement by custom
under the Open Beaches Act.28 Second, it recognized a rolling or migrating
easement that follows relocation of the shoreline or vegetation line or both.29
Finally, the court of appeals ruled that a prior judgment identifying the loca-
tion of a public easement does not preclude the possibility of subsequent
relocation under the doctrine of changed circumstances. 30
Although the trial court recognized the public's right of use upon the ba-
ses of dedication, prescription, and custom, the court of appeals affirmed
solely upon the basis of custom. The court of appeals recognized that the
doctrine of easement by custom was an established concept in Texas
courts.31 Pursuant to the easement by custom theory, the court found suffi-
cient proof existed to support the trial court's conclusion that the public had
acquired an easement over the beach by custom. 32
In affirming the trial court's conclusion that the public had acquired an
easement that migrated with the landward and seaward movement of the
beaches, the court of appeals noted that the law has often recognized the
concept of migrating property rights in situations involving land bordering
on a body of water.33 For example, the line between the state's submerged
property and private beach front property is marked by the line at mean
high tide, a transitory boundary that moves landward or seaward as the
beach moves. 34 Similarly, erosion and accretion along a river may create
migrating easements 35 and property lines. 36 A significant factor in the
court's decision was the particular compatibility of a migrating public ease-
ment with the doctrine of custom. 37 The public use, which established the
custom, must fluctuate with a movement of the beach. The court stated that
28. Id. at 99.
29. Id. at 99-100.
30. Id. at 100.
31. Id. at 98-99. The court mentioned two cases in which the doctrine had been acknowl-
edged and approved although the cases were disposed of on other grounds. Id. City of Galves-
ton v. Menard, 23 Tex. 349, 408 (1859); Moody v. White, 593 S.W.2d 372, 379 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1979, no writ).
32. 711 S.W.2d at 99. The evidence included a passage from DYER, THE EARLY His-
TORY OF TEXAS 59 (1916), in which it was noted that the public had used Galveston's beaches
for travel as early as 1836, as well as the testimony and recollections of various witnesses in
Seaway Co. v. Attorney General, 375 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1964,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
33. 711 S.W.2d at 99.
34. Id.; see also State v. Balli, 144 Tex. 195, 274, 190 S.W.2d 71, 100 (1944); City of
Corpus Christi v. Davis, 622 S.W.2d 640, 642 (Tex. App.-Austin 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
35. See Nonken v. Bexar County, 221 S.W.2d 370, 374 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1949, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
36. 711 S.W.2d at 99.
37. Id. at 100.
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to require an easement to be fixed in place while the beach moves could
result in a submerged easement or one left far inland, either of which would
be useless to the public. Applying static property concepts to this situation,
therefore, would totally defeat the purposes of such an easement. 38
Finally, the court overruled Matcha's allegation of res judicata based on
prior Open Beaches Act litigation. Reasoning that vegetation lines are con-
stantly changing, the court of appeals applied the doctrine of changed cir-
cumstances to resolve the res judicata issue. Under the doctrine, the court
determined that matters subject to change like the location of a vegetation
line cannot be finally adjudicated, but are always open to relitigation. 39
On facts similar to Matcha, the Houston court of appeals in Feinman v.
State4° affirmed the trial court's finding that the public had acquired by im-
plied dedication an easement in Galveston's West Beach. The court of ap-
peals also ruled that the easement was a rolling easement that moved with
the vegetation line, and that the line of vegetation had moved inward follow-
ing Hurricane Alicia. Feinman had sought a declaration from the trial court
that the pre-Alicia vegetation line continued to establish the landward
boundary of the public's easement. The court of appeals upheld the trial
court's finding that the concept of a rolling or migratory easement is consis-
tent with, and implicit in, the Open Beaches Act.41
Alternatively, Feinman argued that Hurricane Alicia had obliterated the
vegetation line. He claimed, therefore, that the court must reconstruct the
vegetation line using the methods set out in section 61.016 of the Act. The
court of appeals rejected Feinman's argument and affirmed the trial court's
conclusion that, rather than being obliterated, the line of vegetation had
move landward following the hurricane.42
B. Water Quality
In Jackson County Vacuum Truck Service, Inc. v. Lavaca-Navidad River
Authority43 the Corpus Christi court of appeals recognized that the inspec-
tion authority of local governments under Chapter 26 of the Texas Water
Code extends to facilities involved in oil and gas production, even though the
Railroad Commission of Texas (TRRC) is given exclusive regulatory au-
thority over such facilities by Texas Water Code section 26.131. 44
The Jackson County Vacuum Truck Service (the company) operated an
injection well in Jackson County that disposed of salt water produced during
oil and gas drilling operations. The Lavaca-Navidad River Authority
(LNRA), a local governmental agency with jurisdiction over Jackson
County, attempted to enter land that the company owned to inspect for
38. Id.
39. Id. (citing Franklin v. Rainey, 556 S.W.2d 583, 585 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no
writ)).
40. 717 S.W.2d 106 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1986, no writ).
41. Id. at I11.
42. Id. at 114.
43. 701 S.W.2d 12 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref'd).
44. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.131 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1987).
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water pollution. The company denied LNRA access to the property.
LNRA subsequently brought suit seeking a declaratory judgment of its right
to enter and inspect the company's land and civil penalities for denial of
access. The Texas Department of Water Resources (TDWR) intervened on
the side of LNRA.
Provisions in the Texas Water Code grant TDWR and local government
authorities the right to enter and inspect private land for possible water pol-
lution. TDWR's inspection authority is set forth in section 26.014 of the
Water Code.45 Identical inspection authority for local governments is set
forth in Water Code section 26.173(a).46
The court of appeals found the company's argument that section 26.131 of
the Water Code delegates sole responsibility for monitoring water quality on
oil and gas lands to TRRC inconsistent with the remainder of chapter 26 of
the Water Code. 47 Instead, the court adopted the position advanced by
TRRC in its amicus curiae brief.48 Under the TRRC interpretation of the
Water Code, TRRC, LNRA, and TDWR have concurrent authority to in-
spect private and public lands, including oil and gas lands, for water pollu-
tion. Concurrent agency jurisdiction ceases, however, if upon inspection
TDWR or a local government authority determines that water pollution is a
result of the production of oil, gas, or other geothermal resources. Once
such a determination is made, TDWR and local government authorities
must yield to the enforcement authority of TRRC. 49
In addition, the company contested the authority of LNRA to bring suit
to recover civil penalties for denial of access. The court rejected the com-
pany's argument, stating that it would be absurd for the legislature to grant
local governments a right to enter and inspect land without any means to
enforce that right.50 Accordingly, the court ruled that the authority of local
governments to bring suit under section 26.124 for violation of the Water
Code provisions includes the right to bring suit for violation of their statu-
tory right to enter and inspect property.51
On September 17, 1986, the Dallas court of appeals withdrew its opinion
issued January 1, 1986, in City of Lucas v. North Texas Municipal Utility
District and substituted a new opinion. 52 The court of appeals reversed the
trial court judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. Arising
in the context of a regional sewage treatment project, the case is of funda-
mental importance for many intergovernmental regulatory relationships.
The North Texas Municipal Water District and four cities5 3 sought to
construct and operate a wastewater treatment project on a 403-acre tract of
45. Id. § 26.014.
46. Id. § 26.173(a).
47. 701 S.W.2d at 13.
48. Id. at 14.
49. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.131 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1987).
50. 701 S.W.2d at 14.
51. Id.
52. No. 05-85-00399-CV (Tex. App.-Dallas, Sept. 17, 1986, writ requested) (not yet
reported).
53. The four cities were the cities of Piano, Richardson, Allen, and McKinney, Texas.
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land in Collin County. Although the tract was located partially within the
corporate limits of the city of Lucas and partly within the city's extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction, the main treatment plant was to be built on 75 acres located
wholly within the city's extraterritorial jurisdiction.5 4 The wastewater treat-
ment plan provided that sewage be brought into the plant through 60-inch
interceptor lines that would pass through the city's corporate limits.
The city sued to enjoin the water district from constructing and operating
the plant without obtaining consent from the city or complying with applica-
ble city ordinances. The trial court rendered judgment against the city, rul-
ing that the water district's enabling legislation55 (the District Act)
permitted the water district to construct and operate sewage treatment facili-
ties without regard to the city's ordinances or its consent. 56 The court of
appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the cause for
further proceedings. 57
The court of appeals first addressed the construction of the District Act.
The District Act authorizes the water district to construct and operate sew-
age treatment facilities 58 and provides that the District Act is controlling in
the event of any conflict or inconsistency between the District Act and other
provisions of law.59 The court held that reasonable regulations designed to
promote the health and safety of the city's residents rather than to prevent
the construction and operation of the treatment plant were consistent with
the District Act.6° As a result, the water district was compelled to comply
with applicable city ordinances. 61 In contrast, the court refused to require
the water district to obtain city consent prior to the construction and opera-
tion of the plant, deeming such a prerequisite in conflict with the provisions
of the District Act.62
The city argued that article 1015 of the civil statutes63 and section 26
.177(b)(5) of the Water Code" granted it authority to regulate activities
within the city's extraterritorial jurisdiction. The court conceded that article
1015 authorized the city to adopt ordinances designed to protect the public
water supply, but ruled that the provision was inapplicable to the instant
case because the city had no public water supply.65 The court similarly
54. No. 05-85-00399-CV, slip op. at 2 n. 1. The extraterritorial jurisdiction of the city of
Lucas consists of all the contiguous unincorporated areas, not a part of any other city within
one-half mile of the corporate limits of the city. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 970a,
§ 3.A(1) (Vernon 1963).
55. Act of Apr. 20, 1951, ch. 62, 1951 Tex. Gen. Laws 96, amended by Act of Apr. 30,
1975, ch. 90, 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws 238.
56. Id. § 27(a).
57. No. 05-85-00399-CV, slip op. at 27.
58. Act of Apr. 30, 1975, ch. 90, § 27(a), 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws 238.
59. Id. § 27(1) at 24.
60. No. 05-85-00399-CV, slip op. at 8.
61. See LucAs, TEX., CODE §§ 3-11 to -17, 6-25, 8-1 to -22, 9-1 to -6 (1985).
62. No. 05-85-00399-CV, slip op. at 9.
63. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1015, § 30 (Vernon 1963).
64. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.177(b)(5) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1987).
65. On December 19, 1986, the Dallas court of appeals issued a supplemental opinion in
City of Lucas. No. 05-85-0039-CV (Tex. App.-Dallas, Dec. 19, 1986). The court agreed to
reconsider its ruling interpreting TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1015 (Vernon 1963). The
1987]
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dismissed the applicability of section 26.177(b)(5) of the Water Code. Sec-
tion 26.177(b)(5) authorizes a city to enact pollution control ordinances that
are enforceable within both its corporate limits and its extraterritorial juris-
diction. City ordinances adopted pursuant to section 26.177(b)(5) must seek
to control water pollution derived from generalized discharges of waste and
not traceable to a specific source.66 Since the water district's wastewater
treatment plant constituted a specific source of water pollution, the court
ruled that section 26.177(b)(5) of the Water Code was inapplicable. 67
The court agreed with the city that article 970a 68 authorizes the city to
extend the applicability of its subdivision control ordinances to its extraterri-
torial jurisdiction. The court found that the 75-acre sewage treatment plant
construction site would lie wholly within the city's extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion. The court further found that the water district planned to fence in the
plant and to supply utilities to the plant.69 Relying on the standard for sub-
division of property proposed by the Corpus Christi court of appeals, 70 the
court determined that by earmarking a tract of land for development and by
physically fencing off a portion of that land, the water district had subdi-
vided that portion of its property located within the city's extraterritorial
jurisdiction. 71 As a result the court of appeals held that the water district
was subject to the city's subdivision control ordinances. 72
In Helbing v. Texas Department of Water Resources73 a rancher appealed
an agency order authorizing the discharge of treated sewage into a West
Texas draw. Both the district and appellate courts affirmed the agency ac-
tion. Helbing challenged the Water Commission's determination that the
wastewater discharges would comply with receiving water quality stan-
dards, 74 and would not degrade the quality of state waters. Although the
case presented potentially troubling issues concerning the application of
water quality standards to a normally dry watercourse, the court declined to
confront such issues directly. Instead it admitted that many Water Commis-
court found that, when a city enters into a contract with a district to supply water to the city's
residents, that water constitutes a public water supply. No. 05-85-0039-CV, slip op. at 9 (cit-
ing TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1109e (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1987)). In this case, because
the city had such a contract with the water district, the court found that article 1015 was
applicable. Id. Accordingly, the court authorized the city to apply regulations designed to
protect the city's water supply to its extra-territorial jurisdiction. The court enumerated those
ordinances and sections of the city's code that it found unenforceable against the water district
as a matter of law. Id. at 4-5, 7-8, 13. Generally, the court found that any ordinances or
sections that attempt to limit the water district's right to construct or maintain the plant,
rather than to regulate the manner of such construction and operation, would be enforceable
as a matter of law. Id. at 4.
66. No. 05-85-00399-CV, slip op. at 12.
67. Id.
68. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 970a, § 4 (Vernon 1963).
69. No. 05-85-00399-CV, slip op. at 13-14.
70. City of Weslaco v. Carpenter, 694 S.W.2d 601, 603 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
71. No. 05-85-00399-CV, slip op. at 14.
72. Id. at 12-13.
73. 713 S.W.2d 134 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, no writ).




sion regulations are inappropriate when "applied to the gullies and arroyos
in the dry and stony lands of West Texas,"'75 and dealt with Helbing's com-
plaint concerning the degradation of water quality as a substantial evidence
question.
Helbing asserted a second argument that nothing in the Commission rec-
ord demonstrated that the discharge permit complied with the federal "anti-
backsliding" requirement. 76 The court of appeals held that the language of
the regulation clearly applied only to permit renewals and thus was inappli-
cable in this case in which the discharge permit was issued for a new treat-
ment plant at a new location and was not a renewal of a previous permit.7 7
A recent suit under the Texas Solid Waste Disposal Act 78 will have direct
bearing upon suits for civil penalties for water quality violations under
Chapter 26 of the Texas Water Code.7 9 In State v. city of Greenville80 the
State of Texas appealed a judgment in which the trial court assessed less
than the minimum statutory penalty against the city of Greenville for the
city's failure to provide an adequate final cover at its municipal solid waste
disposal site. The Dallas court of appeals reversed the trial court's judg-
ment, which imposed a $5,000 fine on the city, and substituted its judgment
assessing the city a fine of $100 per day of violation, or $141,900, the mini-
mum fine provided by the statute.
The civil penalty provision of the Solid Waste Disposal Act provides that
any person who violates the Act or a rule of the Department of Health "is
subject to a civil penalty of not less than $100.00 nor more than $25,000.00
for each act of violation and for each day of violation, as the court may deem
proper .. ".. ,81 The court of appeals held that "is subject to," as used in
section 8(a)(2), is mandatory language and that the legislature intended
every violator to pay a civil penalty within the range stated in the statute.8 2
The court further held that the phrase "as the court may deem proper"
grants a court the discretion to determine the amount of penalty to be as-
sessed within the range given, not the discretion to determine whether to
assess the fine at all.8 3
C. Governmental Liability
1. Sewage Treatment Plant Operation
In Texas the operation of a sewage treatment plant is a governmental
75. 713 S.W.2d at 135 n.1.
76. Id. at 137; see 40 C.F.R. § 122.44 (1) (1). The federal provision requires that renewed
or reissued National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits contain condi-
tions at least as stringent as the conditions contained in the previous permit. Id.
77. 713 S.W.2d at 137.
78. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4477-7 (Vernon 1976 & Supp. 1987).
79. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 26.122, .123 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1987) (civil penalty of
not less than $50 nor more than $10,000 may be assessed per violation per day).
80. No. 05-86-00352-CV (Tex. App.-Dallas, Sept. 30, 1986, writ requested) (not yet
reported).
81. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4477-7, § 8(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
82. No. 05-86-00352-CV, slip op. at 26.
83. Id. at 27.
1987]
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function.84 Consequently, municipalities are exempt from damages caused
through negligent operation of sewage treatment facilities.85 Municipalities,
however, may not damage downstream property owners with impunity. The
Texas Constitution prevents the taking or damaging of property for public
use without compensation.86 During the Survey period two different appel-
late courts had to grapple with this conflict and reached similar conclusions.
Under slightly different theories, each court concluded that operation of a
municipality's sewage treatment plant had, over time, caused sufficient dam-
age to the downstream property owner to amount to a taking that required
compensation.
In City of Uvalde v. Crow87 the owner of a greyhound breeding facility
sued the city of Uvalde to recover damage caused by contaminated water
from the city's sewage treatment plant. Crow alleged that several of his dogs
had died after exposure to the polluted water. The trial court found for
Crow, and the Texarkana court of appeals affirmed. The court held that the
city was liable under the so-called nuisance exception to the governmental
immunity rule found in article I, section 17, of the Texas Constitution. 8
To be considered a nuisance, a condition must unlawfully invade the prop-
erty or rights of others in some manner that is inherent in the thing or condi-
tion itself and does not arise merely from its negligent or improper use.
8 9
The court cited several cases for the proposition that a city-owned plant that
emits smoke or odors, or dumps polluted water or refuse onto another's
land, is a nuisance. 90 Accordingly, the court found that the evidence
presented to the trial court was legally sufficient to support a finding of nui-
sance rather than negligence. 91
The Tyler court of appeals handled a similar suit in Abbott v. City of Kauf-
man.92 The appellate court rejected the trial court's conclusion that, be-
cause the construction and operation of a sewage treatment plant is a
governmental function, the city was immune from liability. The landowners
84. Gotcher v. City of Farmersville, 137 Tex. 12, 14, 151 S.W.2d 565, 566 (1941).
85. City of Texarkana v. Taylor, 490 S.W.2d 191, 192 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1967,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
86. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17. "No person's property shall be taken, damaged or
destroyed for or applied to public use without adequate compensation being made, unless by
the consent of such person .... " Id.
87. 713 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
88. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17.
89. 713 S.W.2d at 156 (citing Gotcher v. City of Farmersville, 137 Tex. 12, 14-15, 151
S.W.2d 565, 566 (1941); Stein v. Highland Park I.S.D., 540 S.W.2d 551, 553 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Texarkana 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
90. See, e.g., City of Abilene v. Downs, 367 S.W.2d 153, 159 (Tex. 1963) (obnoxious
fumes from city sewage disposal plant constitutes a nuisance) (contains comprehensive discus-
sion of case law in this area); City of Fort Worth v. Crawford, 74 Tex. 404, 406, 12 S.W. 52, 54
(1889) (city's disposal of garbage and dead animals on private farm land constitute a nuisance);
City of Abilene v. Bailey, 345 S.W.2d 540, 544 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1961, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (nuisance found where odors and insects cast on adjoining land by city-owned sewage
disposal plant caused reduction in property value).
91. 713 S.W.2d at 157. Ironically, reliance on the nuisance doctrine, while excluding neg-
ligence, forces the court to impose liability for the nonnegligent operation of the sewage plant,
while considering negligent operation protected by governmental immunity.
92. 717 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1986, no writ).
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alleged that the persistent flooding of their lands with sewage had created a
nuisance resulting in a taking of their property without compensation in vio-
lation of article I, section 17, of the Texas Constitution.93 The court ac-
cepted the plaintiff's theory of the case and summarily rejected the city's
argument that any damage must have been due to negligent plant operation.
The court observed that the "nature and persistence of the city's
acts . .. [were] fully as consistent with intentional conduct as with negli-
gence."'94 The opinion provides a good summary of prior cases in the area.
2. Damage Due to Flooding
In Abbott v. City of Princeton 95 the Dallas court of appeals denied munici-
pal immunity for the taking or damaging of property as a result of flooding
due to street construction.96 The city of Princeton raised an expired statute
of limitations as one of its primary defenses. According to facts alleged,
flooding began more than ten years prior to the litigation. Since a cause of
action for permanent damages to the land due to flooding accrued with the
first actionable injury and expired two years thereafter, the court denied re-
covery for permanent damages.97 The court ruled that the Abbotts, how-
ever, could recover for those temporary injuries incurred due to sporadic
flooding contingent upon an irregular force such as rain that occurred within
two years prior to filing suit.98 The court further ruled that limitations did
not bar the plaintiff's suit to abate a continuing nuisance.99
Abbott raised a claim under section 11.086(a) of the Texas Water Code,
which prevents any person from diverting the natural flow of surface water
in a manner that damages another's property.10° The city asserted that sec-
tion 11.086(a) was inapplicable, citing a prior case that held a city was not a
person within the meaning of the predecessor statute to section 11.086(a). 10 1
Recognizing that the water control statutes have since been codified, the
court of appeals reached a contrary conclusion.102 The Code Construction
Act' 0 3 defines the word "person" to include a "government or governmental
subdivision or agency." ' 4 The court concluded, therefore, that municipali-
ties were necessarily within the scope of section 11.086(a) of the Water
Code. '05
Finally, the city contended that, because the plaintiff's property value had
93. See id. at 930-32.
94. Id. at 930.
95. 721 S.W.2d 872 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ requested).
96. Id. at 874.
97. Id. at 875 (citing Bayouth v. Lion Club Oil Co., 671 S.W.2d 867, 868 (Tex. 1984)).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.086(a) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1987).
101. 721 S.W.2d at 875-76 (citing City of Houston v. Renault, 431 S.W.2d 322, 324 (Tex.
1968)).
102. Id. at 876.
103. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 311.001-.0032 (Vernon Parn. 1987).
104. Id. § 311.005(2).
105. 721 S.W.2d at 876.
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appreciated during the period at issue, Abbott had sustained no damage. 106
The court rejected the city's argument, holding that an appreciation in value
of the land over a period of time does not preclude the possibility that the
city reduced the land value below what it would have been absent such
acts. 107
D. Navigable Waters/Bridges
In Trice v. State 10 8 the State of Texas sued to remove a bridge constructed
across the Brazos River without its permission. Pursuant to Natural Re-
sources Code section 11.077,109 the state alleged that it owned the bed and
bottom of the river and that, because the bridge obstructed river navigation,
the bridge constituted " a trespass, a purpresture, and a public nuisance."' 110
Trice, the bridge's builder, responded that he had constructed the bridge
under the authority of a general permit issued by the Army Corps of Engi-
neers, and, therefore, the supremacy clause of the U.S. ConstitutionI 1 had
preempted the state's regulatory scheme and eliminated the need for Trice to
obtain state permission.
The district court entered judgment in favor of the state, ordering Trice to
remove the bridge, restore the bed and bottom of the river, pay damages for
the value of sand and gravel that had been removed, and pay the state's
attorney's fees. The Waco court of appeals affirmed. 112 In overruling
Trice's venue objections, the court of appeals found that the suit fell within
the ambit of section 11.077 of the Natural Resources Code, as a suit con-
cerning state land "occupied, or claimed adversely to the state."' 13 The in-
junctive aspect of the suit, therefore, did not govern venue.' 14
Trice claimed an affirmative right to build his bridge under the "nation-
wide permit" that the Corps of Engineers had issued pursuant to section 404
of the Clean Water Act, to authorize the discharge of dredged or fill material
into the navigable waters of the United States." 1 5 The court of appeals held
that Trice could not rely on the permit and that the Clean Water Act neither
expressly nor impliedly authorizes the Corps of Engineers to grant permits
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. 712 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. App.-Waco 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
109. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 11.077 (Vernon 1978).
110. 712 S.W.2d at 844. "A 'purpresture' is an encroachment upon public rights and ease-
ments or the appropriation to private use of that which belongs to the public." Id. at 844 n.2
(citing Hill Farm, Inc. v. Hill County, 436 S.W.2d 320, 321 (Tex. 1969)).
111. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
112. 712 S.W.2d at 853.
113. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 11.077 (Vernon 1978).
114. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 65.023 (Vernon 1986). Trice contended that
the suit was primarily one for injunctive relief so that article 4656, currently § 65.023, con-
trolled venue. According to Trice, therefore, the suit could be heard in the county of his
domicile rather than the county in which the land was located, as required by § 11.078 of the
Natural Resources Code.




for the construction of bridges. 116
The court similarly rejected Trice's contention that the supremacy clause
nullified the state's authority regarding navigable waters. The court indi-
cated that reconciling state and federal regulatory schemes is more appropri-
ate than construing a conflict between them. 117 Under the federal regulatory
scheme an individual may erect a bridge across a river after obtaining the
proper permit. According to the court, however, the existence of the federal
scheme does not mandate that the state establish a similar permit scheme.
Rather, the federal regulatory scheme can be reasonably interpreted to make
bridge construction contingent upon concurrent or joint assent on the part of
the state.1 18
The court also held that the state was entitled to a directed verdict on the
issue of whether Trice's bridge constituted a purpresture 1 19 The court rea-
soned that, because Trice built a structure that occupied a river bed and
bottom on land owned by the state without receiving permission from the
state to do so, the builder had erected a purpresture.)20
The court of appeals rejected the state's contempt action arising from
Trice's use of the bridge during the pendency of the appeal. Since the trial
court's temporary injunction expired upon the trial court's entry of judg-
ment rather than upon final resolution of the suit, the injunction did not
provide a basis for contempt during the appeal 121
E. Condemnation and Eminent Domain
During the Survey period Texas courts of appeals defined the rights of
municipalities and corporations to condemn property to facilitate the con-
struction and maintenance of sewer systems. In Ratcliff v. City of Keller 122
the Fort Worth court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the district court
denying a temporary injunction. The court of appeals held that a public
improvement such as a storm sewer is a public use of the land, even though
the sewer may serve a development owned by only one person. 123 The city,
therefore, could legitimately exercise its eminent domain authority over Rat-
cliff's land for the construction of a storm sewer.124
In Flores v. Military Highway Water Supply Corp. 125 the Corpus Christi
court of appeals clarified the authority of a water supply and sewer service
corporation to condemn property for the purpose of constructing, maintain-
ing, and operating a sewage disposal plant. The Military Highway Water
Supply Corporation (MHWS) is a nonprofit corporation, organized under
116. 712 S.W.2d at 847.
117. Id. at 848.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 850. For a definition of purpresture see supra note 110.
120. 712 S.W.2d at 850 (citing Hill Farm, Inc. v. Hill County, 436 S.W.2d 320, 321 (Tex.
1969)).
121. Id. at 852-53.
122. 698 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, no writ).
123. Id. at 263.
124. Id.
125. 714 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
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article 1434a of the Texas corporations statutes for the express purpose of
supplying water for general farm and domestic uses. 126 MHWS argued that
it had authority to condemn the Flores's property under either article 1434a
or article 1439 of the civil statute.1 27
Article 1434a allows a corporation organized under its terms to exercise
the right of eminent domain "to acquire rights-of-way."1 28 The court of
appeals held that, although article 1434a gave MHWS the right to acquire
easements and land to create pipeline routes for water supply, the statute
neither directly nor impliedly gave the corporation the power to condemn
land in order to construct, maintain, and operate a sewage disposal plant. 129
The court of appeals interpreted article 1439 of the civil statutes to give a
corporation the power of eminent domain for the purposes of constructing
or maintaining a sewer system in a city or town when the corporation builds
and operates the sewer system with permission from the municipal govern-
ment.130 Accordingly, the court refused to allow MHWS to rely upon the
statute to validate its operations in unincorporated areas. The court held,
therefore, that MHWS had no authority to condemn right of way for sewage
collection lines under either article 1439 or article 1434a.
F. Water Utility Service
Bay Ridge Utility District v. 4M Laundry 31 is an appeal from a judgment
awarding damages of over one-half million dollars, attorney's fees, and per-
manent injunctve relief against Bay Ridge Utility District. The trial court
rendered judgment on the bases of denial of civil rights, tortious business
interference, and breach of contract. All three claims were related to the
utility district's alleged discriminatory provision of utility services.
4M Laundry opened in 1981 as a washateria to serve private residents of
the local subdivision. The municipal utility district that served the subdivi-
sion provided the water and sewer service. By the spring of 1983 the 4M
Laundry owners converted the washateria into a commercial laundry. Fol-
lowing the conversion the utility district experienced sewage treatment diffi-
culties due to the laundry's discharge and a twelve- to fifteen-fold increase in
water consumption. Sewage treatment problems persisted despite the fact
that 4M Laundry installed a pretreatment system for its wastewater dis-
charge at the request of the utility district. The utility district subsequently
notified 4M Laundry that it would limit its water supply and that it could no
longer provide industrial waste treatment. 4M Laundry brought suit for in-
junctive relief to prevent the utility district from limiting 4M Laundry's
water and sewer treatment supply. Three aspects of the case are significant
for the purposes of this Survey; first, the potential civil rights liability associ-
126. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1434a (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1987).
127. Id. arts. 1434a, 1439.
128. Id. art. 1434a, § 4.
129. 714 S.W.2d at 384.
130. Id.
131. 717 S.W.2d 92 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1986 writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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ated with provision of water utility services; second, the degree of judicial
deference due decisions of the utility district's governing body; finally, the
standard of review that the court of appeals applies to rate orders that the
utility district promulgates.
With regard to 4M Laundry's civil rights claim, the court of appeals first
held that continuous service from a public utility established for the purpose
of providing that service is clearly a right protected by 42 U.S.C. section
1983.132 The court qualified the utility district's duty to provide services by
noting that although a district is under a duty to serve its customers without
discrimination, this duty does not give a customer the absolute right to un-
limited service. 133 The court explained that the utility district has a greater
duty to protect the entire system and its users by developing and enforcing
uniform rules and if necessary to require pretreatment of wastewater prior to
discharge to the system pursuant to Water Code section 26.176.134 The ap-
pellate court agreed with the utility district that the trial court should have
dismissed 4M Laundry's civil rights cause of action as frivolous.1 35 4M
Laundry's failure to pay the undisputed portion of its water and sewer bill to
the utility district caused it to forfeit its civil rights cause of action and
opened the way for the utility district's counterclaim for attorney's fees.136
Exhibiting a fair degree of deference to utility district policy, the appellate
court next ruled that the utility district's regulatory actions concerning 4M
Laundry's sewage discharge were not unreasonable.1 37 Since 4M Laundry
produced the only industrial discharges in the utility district, the utility dis-
trict could regulate 4M Laundry in a different fashion from residential cus-
tomers, at least within the scope of authority granted by section 26.176.138
The court of appeals further held that the trial court was not authorized to
second guess the utility district's decision not to sell discounted bonds to
finance an expansion of the sewage treatment plant.1 39 Such judicial action
would constitute interference with the legislative process. 40 In an interest-
ing contrast to the Ratcliff v. City of Keller of Keller decision discussed
above, the Bay Ridge court also considered the utility district's authority to
condemn an easement for wastewater discharged by 4M Laundry. 141 The
court of appeals ruled that, because the easement was only for the benefit of
4M Laundry and would be owned by 4M Laundry, its acquisition was not
for a public purpose and so was not authorized under Water Code section
132. Id. at 98 (citing Limuel v. Southern Union Gas, 378 F. Supp. 964, 966 (W.D. Tex.
1974)).
133. Id. at 98-99.
134. Id.; TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.176 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1987).
135. 717 S.W.2d at 105.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 99.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.; see TEX. CoNsT. art. II, § 1.
141. 717 S.W.2d at 100-01. Under an interlocutory order before the trial court, the parties
had apparently agreed that 4M Laundry or its successor would construct its own sewage treat-




56.119.142 Finally, the court of appeals reversed the trial court finding re-
jecting the utility district's water and sewer rates.143 Applying a substantial
evidence standard of review, the court of appeals stipulated that the trial
court could not change the utility district's rate formula simply because it
found another formula more desirable. 144
II. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
A. Sixty-Ninth Legislature's "Water Package"
The 69th Legislature adopted a comprehensive series of amendments to
the Texas Water Code as part of House Bill 2, its overall water package.145
As a compromise between the interests of environmental groups and water
development promoters, the legislature made numerous progressive statu-
tory modifications. The effectiveness of these changes, however, depended
upon voter approval of additional bonds for water development and related
purposes.
One thrust of the statutory package was increased emphasis on water con-
servation that is translated into specific measures designed to reduce con-
sumption under both Water Development Board 46 and Water Commission
programs.147 In addition to conservation measures, the legislature also
adopted statutory provisions pertaining to bays and estuaries and in-stream
uses 148 and reserved water in future state reservoir projects for satisfying bay
and estuary needs and in-stream uses.149 Finally, House Bill 2 substantially
142. Id. at 101; TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 56.119 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
143. 717 S.W.2d at 104.
144. Id.
145. For a discussion of the amendments adopted by the 69th Legislature see House, Water
Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 40 Sw.L.J. 391-400 (1986).
146. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 15.103 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1987) (applicant's to the
Texas Water Development Board seeking financial assistance pursuant to the Water Loan
Assistance Program must set forth details of water conservation program); id. § 15.106 (appli-
cant's implementation of a water conservation program precondition to board approval of
financial assistance); id. § 17.122 (political subdivision applicants to Texas Water Development
Board for financial assistance to fund engineering projects designed to conserve and develop
state water resources must set forth details of water conservation programs); id. § 17.125
(political subdivision applicant's adoption of a water conservation program precondition to
board approval of financial assistance).
147. See id. § 11.1271 (Texas Water Commission may make issuance of state water use
permits contingent upon applicant's formulation and submission of water conservation plan);
id. § 11.134 (requires successful water use permit applicant to provide evidence that diligence
will be used to avoid waste and achieve water conservation); id. § 11.037 (requires persons or
associations engaged in conserving or supplying water to develop and publish rules regarding
(1) method of supply; (2) use and distribution of water; and (3) water application and payment
procedures).
148. See id. § 11.147 (requires Texas Water Commission to evaluate impact of issuance of
permit to store, take, or divert water on bays and estuaries, instream uses of water, and fish
and wildlife habitats); id. § 11.148 (provides for emergency suspension of permit conditions
concerning beneficial inflows to affected bays and estuaries and instream uses); id. § 11.149
(requires Texas Parks and Wildlife Department and Texas Water Department to conduct bay
and estuary data collection and analyses; requires Texas Water Commission to evaluate the
impact of issuance of permit to store, take, or divert water in excess of 5,000 acre feet per year
on fish and wildlife habitats).
149. See id. § 15.3041 (reservation and appropriation of five percent of annual firm yield of
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revised the provisions of Texas Water Code chapter 52 related to the crea-
tion of underground water conservation districts, including the establish-
ment of a mandated procedure within the Texas Water Commission to
require consideration of underground districts in critical areas. 150 Voter ap-
proval of Proposition 1 in the November 1985 constitutional amendment
election brought the foregoing House Bill 2 provisions into effect.
B. Sixty-Ninth Legislature, Third Called Session
During the special session called to address the state's financial situation,
the legislature adopted two bills pertaining to water law. House Bill 59
amended Texas Water Code sections 11.173151 and 11.178.152 These provi-
sions deal with cancellation of water rights for nonuse during a ten-year
period. The House Bill 59 amendment inserts an exception for water rights
on agricultural land that has been taken out of production due to the farm-
ers' decision to participate in the Conservation Reserve Program authorized
by the Food Security Act. 153 House Bill 46154 expands the purposes of
water supply corporations formed under article 1434a of the civil statutes.1 55
As a result, water supply corporations are authorized to provide flood con-
trol and drainage systems for political subdivisions or private corporations
and individuals, 156 and to enter into contracts with such entities for this
purpose. 157
water in any reservoir to Texas Parks and Wildlife Department for release to bays and estua-
ries and for instream uses pursuant to the Texas Water Assistance Program); id. § 16.1331
(same; applicable to water development in Texas generally).
150. Id. §§ 52.023-.024 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
151. Id. § 11.173 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1987).
152. Id. § 11.178.
153. Food Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-198, §§ 1231-1236, 99 Stat. 1354, 1509-
1514.
154. Act of Oct. 15, 1986, ch. 28, § 1, 1986 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 678 (Vernon).
155. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1434a (Vernon Supp. 1987).
156. Id. § 1.
157. Id. § 2.
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